

**IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS**

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

JASON M REDMON
Claimant

APPEAL NO. 06A-UI-10417-JTT

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
DECISION**

LABOR READY MIDWEST INC
Employer

OC: 05/28/06 R: 04
Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code section 96.6(2) - Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Jason Redmon filed an appeal from the July 17, 2006, reference 09, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held by telephone conference call on November 8, 2006. Mr. Redmon participated. The employer failed to respond to the hearing notice instructions to provide a telephone number for the hearing and did not participate. The administrative law judge took official notice of the Agency's administrative file, marked Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 for identification purposes, and received Department Exhibit D-3 into evidence. The hearing in this matter was consolidated with the hearing in appeal number 06A-UI-10418-JTT.

ISSUE:

Whether the claimant's appeal was timely. It was not.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: The July 17, 2006, reference 09, decision denying benefits was mailed to Jason Redmon's last-known address of record on July 17, 2006. The decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 27, 2006. On July 20, 2006, the Agency mailed the reference 10 overpayment decision to Mr. Redmon at the same address. The second decision contained a warning that an appeal must be postmarked or received by the Appeals Section by July 30, 2006. Mr. Redmon received both decisions in a timely fashion, prior to the deadline for appeal. Mr. Redmon had become re-employed at the time the decisions entered and did not take any immediate steps to appeal either decision. In August and September, the Agency mailed Mr. Redmon a monthly overpayment statement and request for payment. Mr. Redmon received these documents, but did not respond to them. On October 27, 2006, Mr. Redmon delivered an appeal of the reference 09 and the reference 10 decisions to the Dubuque Workforce Development Center. The Dubuque Workforce Development Center immediately faxed the appeal and accompanying documents to the Appeals Section. In the appeal, Mr. Redmon wrote, "I realize this is late, however I have been working full-time and was not aware of any deadline for appealing."

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5, except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary quit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); Johnson v. Board of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (Iowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b). Any decision mailed by the Unemployment Insurance Division is considered as having been given to the addressee to whom it is directed on the date of the document, unless otherwise indicated by the facts. 871 IAC 24.35(3).

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The Iowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a

representative if a timely appeal is not filed. Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case show that the notice was invalid. Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Iowa 1979); see also In re Appeal of Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Iowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. Hendren v. IESC, 217 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1974); Smith v. IESC, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 1973). Mr. Redmon testified that he did not recall receiving a copy of the July 17, 2006, reference 09, disqualification decision. Mr. Redmon testified that he received the July 20, 2006, reference 10, overpayment decision sometime in July. The reference 10 overpayment decision specifically referenced that it was based on the disqualification decision that had just entered. Having heard Mr. Redmon's testimony, the administrative law judge concludes that Mr. Redmon is not a reliable historian, especially in light of the delay between entry of the decisions and Mr. Redmon's appeal. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Redmon received each decision prior to the deadline for appeal, had a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal in each matter, and elected not to pursue an appeal at the time. The evidence further indicates that Mr. Redmon waited three months to file an appeal despite having received the Agency's monthly reminders that he had been overpaid. This delay was unreasonable with regard to both of the decisions that entered in July.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the Iowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes the claimant unreasonably delayed filing an appeal. See 871 IAC 24.35(3). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, Beardslee v. IDJS, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and Franklin v. IDJS, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

The Agency representative's July 17, 2006, reference 09, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed

jet/pjs