

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section
1000 East Grand—Des Moines, Iowa 50319
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
68-0157 (7-97) – 3091078 - EI

DARYL D HANUS
1795 S AVE
TRAER IA 50675

STEVENS MATTRESS OF IOWA INC
1251 S 48TH ST
GRAND FORKS ND 58201

Appeal Number: 04A-UI-10808-DT
OC: 11/23/04 R: 03
Claimant: Appellant (2)

This Decision Shall Become Final, unless within fifteen (15) days from the date below, you or any interested party appeal to the Employment Appeal Board by submitting either a signed letter or a signed written Notice of Appeal, directly to the **Employment Appeal Board, 4th Floor—Lucas Building, Des Moines, Iowa 50319.**

The appeal period will be extended to the next business day if the last day to appeal falls on a weekend or a legal holiday.

STATE CLEARLY

1. The name, address and social security number of the claimant.
2. A reference to the decision from which the appeal is taken.
3. That an appeal from such decision is being made and such appeal is signed.
4. The grounds upon which such appeal is based.

YOU MAY REPRESENT yourself in this appeal or you may obtain a lawyer or other interested party to do so provided there is no expense to Workforce Development. If you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you may obtain the services of either a private attorney or one whose services are paid for with public funds. It is important that you file your claim as directed, while this appeal is pending, to protect your continuing right to benefits.

(Administrative Law Judge)

(Decision Dated & Mailed)

Section 96.5-2-a – Discharge
Section 96.7-2-a(2) – Charges Against Employer's Account

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Daryl D. Hanus (claimant) appealed a representative's September 27, 2004 decision (reference 02) that concluded he was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits after a separation from employment with Stevens' Mattress of Iowa, Inc. (employer). After hearing notices were mailed to the parties' last-known addresses of record, a telephone hearing was held on October 28, 2004. The claimant participated in the hearing. Deb Ratliff appeared on the employer's behalf. Based on the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the law, the administrative law judge enters the following findings of fact, reasoning and conclusions of law, and decision.

ISSUES:

Was the claimant discharged for work-connected misconduct? Is the employer's account subject to charge?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The claimant started working for the employer on January 12, 2004. He worked full time as a state area delivery truck driver for the employer's Toledo, Iowa, bed manufacturing business. His last day of work was September 3, 2004. The employer discharged him on that date. The reason asserted for the discharge was dangerous driving.

On September 3, the truck leasing company received a complaint about the claimant's driving and passed it on to the employer. The complaint was that the claimant had tailgated another truck, then passed him on the right and cut back in too close to the other truck. As a result, the claimant was discharged. On that date, the claimant was driving in Waterloo, Iowa, at approximately 6:45 a.m. in a low visibility situation. Another truck pulled in front of the claimant too close, forcing the claimant to pull over to the right shoulder in order to avoid hitting the other truck. He proceeded to pass the other truck on the shoulder and pulled back onto the roadway as soon as he had cleared the other truck so as to avoid additional driving on the shoulder. He did "flip off" the other driver, who apparently then called the claimant into the truck leasing company.

The claimant established an unemployment insurance benefit year effective November 23, 2003. He filed an additional claim effective September 5, 2004.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

The issue in this case is whether the employer discharged the claimant for reasons establishing work-connected misconduct as defined by the unemployment insurance law. The issue is not whether the employer was right to terminate the claimant's employment, but whether the claimant is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Infante v. IDJS, 364 N.W.2d 262 (Iowa App. 1984). What constitutes misconduct justifying termination of an employee and what is misconduct that warrants denial of unemployment insurance benefits are two separate questions. Pierce v. IDJS, 425 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa App. 1988).

A claimant is not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits if an employer has discharged the claimant for reasons constituting work-connected misconduct. Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a. Before a claimant can be denied unemployment insurance benefits, the employer has the burden to establish the claimant was discharged for work-connected misconduct. Cosper v. IDJS, 321 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1982).

Iowa Code section 96.5-2-a provides:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

2. Discharge for misconduct. If the department finds that the individual has been discharged for misconduct in connection with the individual's employment:
 - a. The individual shall be disqualified for benefits until the individual has worked in and has been paid wages for insured work equal to ten times the individual's weekly benefit amount, provided the individual is otherwise eligible.

871 IAC 24.32(1)a provides:

Discharge for misconduct.

(1) Definition.

a. "Misconduct" is defined as a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to the employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed misconduct within the meaning of the statute.

This definition has been accepted by the Iowa Supreme Court as accurately reflecting the intent of the legislature. Huntoon v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 275 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1979).

The focus of the definition of misconduct is on acts or omissions by a claimant that "rise to the level of being deliberate, intentional or culpable." Henry v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 391 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa App. 1986). The acts must show:

1. Willful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest, such as found in:
 - a. Deliberate violation of standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of its employees, or
 - b. Deliberate disregard of standards of behavior the employer has the right to expect of its employees; or
2. Carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to:
 - a. Manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design; or
 - b. Show an intentional and substantial disregard of:
 1. The employer's interest, or
 2. The employee's duties and obligations to the employer.

Henry, supra. The reason cited by the employer for discharging the claimant is dangerous driving. The employer has not established that it was the claimant who was guilty of dangerous driving; rather, the claimant's passing on the right was a safe and reasonable reaction under the situation. He was not discharged for expressing his displeasure at the other driver. The employer has not met its burden to show disqualifying misconduct. Cosper, supra. Based upon the evidence provided, the claimant's actions were not misconduct within the meaning of the statute, and the claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

The final issue is whether the employer's account is subject to charge. An employer's account is only chargeable if the employer is a base period employer. Iowa Code section 96.7. The base period is "the period beginning with the first day of the five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's benefit year and ending with the last day of the next to the last completed calendar quarter immediately preceding the date on which the

individual filed a valid claim.” Iowa Code section 96.19-3. The claimant’s base period began July 1, 2002 and ended June 30, 2003. The employer did not employ the claimant during this time, and, therefore, the employer is not currently a base period employer and its account is not currently chargeable for benefits paid to the claimant.

DECISION:

The representative’s September 27, 2004 decision (reference 02) is reversed. The employer did discharge the claimant but not for disqualifying reasons. The claimant is qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits, if he is otherwise eligible. The employer’s account is not subject to charge in the current benefit year.

ld/tjc