IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS

68-0157 (9-06) - 3091078 - EI

LEAH JACKSON

Claimant

APPEAL NO. 13A-UI-13883-JTT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION

MCMURRIN TRUCKING MCMURRIN TRUCKING

Employer

OC: 10/27/13

Claimant: Appellant (1)

Iowa Code Section 96.5(1) – Voluntary Quit Iowa Code Section 96.6(2) – Timeliness of Appeal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Leah Jackson filed an appeal from the November 20, 2013, reference 01, decision that denied benefits. After due notice was issued, a hearing was held on January 13, 2014. Ms. Jackson participated. Dean Weis represented the employer and presented additional testimony through Mike McMurrin. Department Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were received into evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the appeal was timely. Whether there is good cause to treat the appeal as timely.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record, the administrative law judge finds: On November 20, 2013, Iowa Workforce Development mailed a copy of the November 20, 2013, reference 01, decision to Leah Jackson's last-known address of record. The decision denied benefits. The decision contained a warning that an appeal from the decision must be postmarked by November 30, 2013 or received by the Appeals Section by that day. Ms. Jackson received the decision on or about November 22, 2013. Ms. Jackson did not take any steps to appeal the decision until the week of December 8-14, 2013, when she stopped into the Cedar Rapids Workforce Development Center and scheduled an appointment with a Workforce Development representative. The appointment was set for December 16, 2013. On December 16, 2013, Ms. Jackson completed an appeal form with the assistance of the Workforce Development representative. Ms. Jackson delivered the completed appeal form to the staff at the Cedar Rapids Workforce Development Center. The Appeals Section received the appeal on December 19, 2013.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Iowa Code section 96.6-2 provides:

2. Initial determination. A representative designated by the director shall promptly notify all interested parties to the claim of its filing, and the parties have ten days from the date of mailing the notice of the filing of the claim by ordinary mail to the last known address to protest payment of benefits to the claimant. The representative shall promptly examine the claim and any protest, take the initiative to ascertain relevant information concerning the claim, and, on the basis of the facts found by the representative, shall determine whether or not the claim is valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and its maximum duration, and whether any disqualification shall be imposed. The claimant has the burden of proving that the claimant meets the basic eligibility conditions of section 96.4. The employer has the burden of proving that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to section 96.5. except as provided by this subsection. The claimant has the initial burden to produce evidence showing that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 10, and has the burden of proving that a voluntary guit pursuant to section 96.5, subsection 1, was for good cause attributable to the employer and that the claimant is not disqualified for benefits in cases involving section 96.5, subsection 1, paragraphs "a" through "h". Unless the claimant or other interested party, after notification or within ten calendar days after notification was mailed to the claimant's last known address, files an appeal from the decision, the decision is final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision. If an administrative law judge affirms a decision of the representative, or the appeal board affirms a decision of the administrative law judge allowing benefits, the benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which is thereafter taken, but if the decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with benefits so paid and this relief from charges shall apply to both contributory and reimbursable employers, notwithstanding section 96.8, subsection 5.

The ten-day deadline for appeal begins to run on the date Workforce Development mails the decision to the parties. The "decision date" found in the upper right-hand portion of the Agency representative's decision, unless otherwise corrected immediately below that entry, is presumptive evidence of the date of mailing. <u>Gaskins v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Rev.</u>, 429 A.2d 138 (Pa. Comm. 1981); <u>Johnson v. Board of Adjustment</u>, 239 N.W.2d 873, 92 A.L.R.3d 304 (lowa 1976).

An appeal submitted by mail is deemed filed on the date it is mailed as shown by the postmark or in the absence of a postmark the postage meter mark of the envelope in which it was received, or if not postmarked or postage meter marked or if the mark is illegible, on the date entered on the document as the date of completion. See 871 AC 24.35(1)(a). See also Messina v. IDJS, 341 N.W.2d 52 (Iowa 1983). An appeal submitted by any other means is deemed filed on the date it is received by the Unemployment Insurance Division of Iowa Workforce Development. See 871 IAC 24.35(1)(b).

The evidence in the record establishes that more than ten calendar days elapsed between the mailing date and the date this appeal was filed. The lowa Supreme Court has declared that there is a mandatory duty to file appeals from representatives' decisions within the time allotted by statute, and that the administrative law judge has no authority to change the decision of a representative if a timely appeal is not filed. <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1979). Compliance with appeal notice provisions is jurisdictional unless the facts of a case

show that the notice was invalid. <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373, 377 (lowa 1979); see also <u>In re Appeal of Elliott</u>, 319 N.W.2d 244, 247 (lowa 1982). The question in this case thus becomes whether the appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to assert an appeal in a timely fashion. <u>Hendren v. IESC</u>, 217 N.W.2d 255 (lowa 1974); <u>Smith v. IESC</u>, 212 N.W.2d 471, 472 (lowa 1973).

The record shows that the appellant did have a reasonable opportunity to file a timely appeal. At the time Ms. Jackson received the decision on November 22, 2013, she still had eight days in which to file an appeal by the stated November 30, 2013 deadline. Because that deadline fell on a Saturday, Ms. Jackson actually had until Monday, December 2, 2013 to file a timely appeal. Ms. Jackson waited until at least a week beyond the extended deadline to take any steps to file an appeal. When Ms. Jackson stopped into the Workforce Development office during the week of December 8-14, 2013, her appeal was also a week late. Any additional delay between the day she stopped in to make an appointment and December 16, when she had the appointment and delivered the completed appeal form took place after the appeal was already a week or more past due.

The administrative law judge concludes that failure to file a timely appeal within the time prescribed by the lowa Employment Security Law was not due to any Agency error or misinformation or delay or other action of the United States Postal Service. See 871 IAC 24.35(2). The administrative law judge further concludes that the appeal was not timely filed pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.6(2), and the administrative law judge lacks jurisdiction to make a determination with respect to the nature of the appeal. See, <u>Beardslee v. IDJS</u>, 276 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1979) and <u>Franklin v. IDJS</u>, 277 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa 1979).

DECISION:

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The Agency representative's November 20, 2013, reference 01, decision is affirmed. The appeal in this case was not timely, and the decision of the representative remains in effect. The claimant is disqualified for benefits until she had worked in and been paid wages for insured work equal to 10 times her weekly benefit amount. The claimant would also have to meet all other eligibility requirements. The employer's account will not be charged.

James E. Timberland
Administrative Law Judge

Decision Dated and Mailed